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Arbitration in SEP/FRAND Disputes: Overview
and Core Issues
Peter Georg PICHT* & Gaspare Tazio LODERER**
This article takes a look at arbitration in intellectual property matters with regards to the licensing of
standard-essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Due
to the digital transformation, the importance of FRAND licensing of SEPs is likely to increase and with
it the need for appropriate conflict resolution. This is where arbitration can come into play due to its
flexibility and efficiency. The resolution of SEP/FRAND disputes through Alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) is also supported by administrative and judicial bodies and institutions such as the
International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) have already gained experience in this field. The article
lays down particularities regarding the scope of arbitration in such disputes before briefly touching upon
the question of arbitrability. Due to the lack of a law applicable to a pre-existing contract in prototypical
SEP/FRAND constellations, the choice of law is also of importance. A special emphasis is put on the
issue of confidentiality in view of a public interest in having access to key results of SEP/FRAND
arbitration proceedings. As set forth in the article, the FRAND ADR Guidelines authored by the
Munich IPDR Forum propose a solution in the form of disclosure of the FRAND determination
methodology to a neutral instance, subject to party approval. Lastly, the article looks at how state courts
might assess licenses reached in alternative dispute resolution and examines whether EU competition law
is a public policy hurdle in subsequent enforcement proceedings.
1 INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in intellectual property (IP) matters is by no
means a new phenomenon.1 Of late, however, it has considerably increased its
traction in the field of, and due to, the licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs)
on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.2 Some spectacular
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Court of Cologne (OLG Köln), 19 Sch. 8/11 (16 July 2012); Federal Patent Court (BPatG), 33 W
(pat) 58/10 (12 June 2012).
2 See Peter Chrocziel, Boris Kasolowsky, Robert Whitener & Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont,
International Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes – A Practitioner’s Guide (2017); Peter G. Picht,
SEP/FRAND arbitration proceedings have taken place3 and the legal development
was fostered by projects such as the SEP communication of the EU Commission4
and the ‘FRAND ADR Case Management Guidelines’ of the Munich IP Dispute
Resolution Forum.5 As the trend is likely to intensify, it seems worthwhile to take
a closer look at this specific field of IP ADR. Alternative dispute resolution in
SEP/FRAND matters is not completely different from other IP or commercial
proceedings. Some aspects, however, are particular and this article aims at high-
lighting a selection of them.
2 REASONS FOR THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF IP AND SEP/
FRAND ARBITRATION
2.1 STANDARD-SETTING – FRAND licensing – Digital transformation
If a technical standard contains components for which patents have been granted,
market players who wish to use the standard for products or other market activities
(standard implementers) have an interest in being able to do so without restrictions
on the part of the patent holder and, if possible, without having to pay royalties.
The patent owner, on the other hand, wants to exert at least some sort of control
over the use of its patented technology. In many cases, the patentee also wishes to
receive royalties, cross-licenses or some other quid pro quo. Sometimes, it is its
goal to prevent use of the patented technology by certain implementers altogether.
These diverging positions might be reconciled if the patent holder is required
to license its patents on reasonable terms and conditions. In principle, this ensures
access and use for the standard implementer as well as control and compensation
for the patent owner. Ideally, such a licensing scheme would also prevent ques-
tionable attempts to enforce one’s own interests, as described by the (in)famous
International Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes – A Practitioner’s Guide, GRUR 679 (2017);
Daniel K. Kaneko, EU-Einheitspatent und Schiedsverfahren (2018); Michael Groß, IP-/IT-Mediation (3rd
ed., 2018); Nadine Haubner, Patentstreitigkeiten und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, InTeR 239 (2014); Peter G.
Picht, Einheitspatentsystem: Die Kompetenzreichweite des Mediations- und Schiedszentrums, GRUR Int. 1
(2018); see also WIPO’s Caseload Summary: www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/caseload.html (all Internet
sources last accessed on 18 June 2019).
3 BlackBerry v. Qualcomm (www.marketwatch.com/story/blackberry-awarded-final-940-million-in-arbi
tration-with-qualcomm-over-royalties-2017-05-26); InterDigital v. Huawei (https://thepatentinvestor.
com/2016/04/interdigital-fends-off-huawei-effort-to-annul-arbitration-award-in-paris-allowing-
case-in-federal-court-to-proceed); Nokia v. LG Electronics (www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/26/
nokia-favorable-arbitration-award-patent-license-lg-electronics/id=88063), Nokia v. BlackBerry
(www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-nokia-patents/blackberry-loses-payment-dispute-with-
nokia-to-pay-137-million-idUSKBN1DV517), Apple v. Samsung.
4 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
and the European Economic and Social Committee, Setting out the EU Approach to Standard
Essential Patents, COM(2017)712 final (29 Nov. 2017).
5 See www.ipdr-forum.org/guidelines.
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terms ‘hold-up’ (‘extortion’ of inappropriate licensing conditions by the patent
holder) and ‘hold-out’ (attempt to avoid, in particular by delaying tactics, the
taking of and paying for a license by the implementer).6 A SEP owner’s obligation
to license stems, in its prototypical constellation, from a FRAND licensing com-
mitment declared to the respective standard-setting organization (SSO). Although
the commitment is, technically, a voluntary one, it results at least partly from the
fact that many SSOs make the declaration of SEPs – or, more precisely, of patents
their owners perceive as being or becoming standard-essential – and the submission
of FRAND licensing declarations for these patents a precondition for the inclusion
of patent protected technology into the standard, a fact that ensures comprehensive
availability of a FRAND licensing option.7 The advantages of this mechanism,
together with the great (economic) importance of technical standards for the
market players concerned and for the general welfare,8 especially in the informa-
tion and communication sector (ICT),9 have led to FRAND licensing being
widely recognized (sometimes too enthusiastically) as an approach worthy of
support.10
At the same time, however, even this simplified sketch of the FRAND
mechanism, which in practice knows many variants,11 reveals several points of
6 See Vincent Angwenyi & Marie Barani, Smokescreen Strategies: What Lies Behind the Hold-up Argument?,
GRUR Int. 204 (2018); BowmanHeiden &Nicolas Petit, Patent ‘Trespass’ and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the
Nature and Impact of Patent Holdout, 34 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 179 (2018); Peter G. Picht,The ECJ Rules
on Standard-Essential Patents: Thoughts and Issues Post-Huawei, 37 ECLR 365 (2016).
7 An overview over SSOs that require FRAND declarations (in different variations) can be found in
Peter G. Picht, Strategisches Verhalten bei der Nutzung von Patenten in Standardisierungsverfahren aus der
Sicht des europäischen Kartellrechts 189–217 (2014); Rudi Bekkers & Andrew Updegrove, A Study of IPR
Policies and Practices of a Representative Group of Standards Setting Organizations Worldwide, https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2333445; important examples are ETSI and ANSI. The legal nature of FRAND
declarations depends on the law applicable to them. Different theories are being discussed regarding
their dogmatic classification: invitatio ad offerendum, offerta ad incertas personas, third-party beneficial
contract, pactum de non petendo, waiver in rem of the exclusive right, see Mary-Rose McGuire, Die
FRAND-Erklärung, Anwendbares Recht, Rechtsnatur und Bindungswirkung am Beispiel eines ETSI-
Standards, GRUR 128, 131–32 (2018), who considers the FRAND declarations for ETSI standards
in application of French law as a contract in favour of third parties.
8 On the importance of standardization, see Peter G. Picht, Standardsetzung und
Patentmissbrauch – Schlagkraft und Entwicklungsbedarf des europäischen Kartellrechts, GRUR Int. 1, 2
(2014); Haris Tsilikas, Collaborative Standardization and Disruptive Innovation: The Case of Wireless
Telecommunication Standards, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper
No. 16–06, 1, 13–21.
9 Especially in the ICT sector, interconnectivity between different devices would not even be possible
without SEPs. Without interoperability, 40% of the potential advantages of the Internet of Things
would not be realized, see EU Commission, supra n. 4, at 1.
10 Claudia Tapia & Spyros Makris, Negotiating SEP Licenses in Europe after Huawei v. ZTE: Guidance from
National Courts, managingip.com May 2018, 29, www.4ipcouncil.com/application/files/1315/3018/
6300/21-29_article_SEPs.pdf; Haris Tsilikas, Huawei v. ZTE in Context – EU Competition Policy and
Collaborative Standardization in Wireless Telecommunications, 48 IIC 151, 175 (2017).
11 Not all policies are working with the classical FRAND mechanism, see the overview in Bekkers &
Updegrove, supra n. 7, at 89, table 13; a detailed description can be found in Picht, supra n. 7, at 189–
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potential conflict: Is the patent for which a FRAND declaration has been issued
truly a valid and standard-essential patent at all? Has a patent owner failed to
declare certain SEPs or neglected a FRAND declaration? Can any market parti-
cipant ask for a license based on a FRAND declaration or do additional criteria
need to be met? Last but not least: which conditions are FRAND in a specific case?
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that FRAND licensing generates a substantial
number of legal disputes.12
With the digital transformation of large parts of our economies, the
importance of the (FRAND) licensing of SEPs on ICT standards is likely to
further increase significantly. New market sectors are going to be incorporated
into a digital environment which is based, to an important extent, on ICT
standards such as the 5G telecommunication standard.13 It is no longer just
smartphone producers, telecommunication service providers or online shop
operators that have to deal with the licensing of ICT SEPs, but also the
agricultural industry, waterworks operators, and car makers. For example,
‘smart farming’ uses ICT in agriculture (GPS-enabled tractors, sensors com-
municating soil fertility data via mobile communication networks, etc.),14 and
hence licenses on such ICT infrastructure become essential. Self-driving,
connected vehicles are a key component of mobility’s digital future and
have already led to litigation between communications companies and car
manufacturers.15 Thus, a great number of new players enter the game, and
their previous know-how, corporate cultures, and interests are, at times, quite
different from those of established ICT players familiar with the realities of
the sector. This may cause positive effects, but it can also be a source of
friction. Hence, digital transformation does increase the importance of appro-
priate conflict resolution mechanisms for SEP/FRAND licensing.
217; it is also not settled what should apply if the SEP owner has not issued a FRAND declaration at
all, see Picht, supra n. 6, at 371.
12 SEPs tend to be more often in dispute than ordinary patents, see EU Commission, Patents and
Standards, A Modern Framework for IPR-based Standardization, Final Report, Ref. Ares(2014)
917720 125–26 (25 Mar. 2014).
13 Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum (IPDR), FRAND ADR Case Management Guidelines, 7,
www.ipdr-forum.org/guidelines [hereinafter ‘FRAND Guidelines’].
14 See in more detail www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2016-06-09/factory-fresh.
15 As an example, the German carmaker Daimler complained to the EU Commission about Nokia’s
patents being essential to car communication, asking for ‘clarification on how essential patents for
telecommunications standards are to be licensed in the automotive industry’ (www.reuters.com/
article/us-eu-daimler-nokia-patents/daimler-asks-eu-antitrust-regulators-to-probe-nokia-patents-
idUSKCN1RA2KF). Nokia, in turn, started a patent lawsuit at the regional courts of Düsseldorf,
Mannheim and Munich (www.juve-patent.com/news-and-stories/cases/daimler-faces-next-con
nected-cars-dispute).
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2.2 STRENGTHS OF ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS COMPARED TO STATE COURT
PROCEEDINGS
ADR in general, and specifically in SEP/FRAND cases, is not categorically ‘better’
than state court dispute resolution. It displays certain strengths, however, which can
make it the preferable choice in appropriate settings. Among these advantages16 is
the parties’ ability to choose arbitrators or mediators with the necessary expertise for
SEP/FRAND disputes, which are often complex, not only in a legal but also in a
technical and economic sense.
Secondly, ADR promises a higher degree of confidentiality, even considering
certain restrictions in the interest of other market participants and the general
public (see section 8 below). Confidentiality can be of particular relevance for
SEP/FRAND disputes, as the economic stakes are often high and the proceedings
allow for a deep insight into the licensing practices and business models of the
parties involved.17
Thirdly, the ‘portfolio component’ of typical SEP/FRAND settings looms
large: because SEP portfolios consist of numerous patent ‘families,’18 with siblings
originating from various jurisdictions, they can be cause (and ammunition) for legal
disputes before multiple national courts which base their jurisdiction on the
respective domestic SEPs in the portfolio.19 This generates risks of forum shop-
ping, of waste of resources due to parallel proceedings,20 and of conflicting
decisions. ADR proceedings, on the other hand, can be shaped more easily to
cover entire SEP portfolios. For instance, arbitration tribunals are not hindered by
some sort of territoriality principle to hear cases relating to patents from various
jurisdictions, and it can be hugely time and cost effective to have all (technologi-
cally identical) members of a patent family assessed by one such tribunal instead of
16 Frequently mentioned advantages of international arbitration in general include the possibility to
choose a neutral forum; confidentiality; potentially rather cheap and fast proceedings; far-reaching
party autonomy and flexibility (e.g. choice of arbitrators with special expertise in the dispute, language
of proceedings); limited means to appeal the decision; relatively simple enforceability on the basis of
the New York Convention, see Gary Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, Ch. 1, paras 16–
24 (2nd ed., 2015).
17 Cf. TCL Commun. Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVS-
DFM (C.D. Cal. 2017), Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with detailed
statements on the strength of Ericsson’s patent portfolio and on (from the court’s point of view)
appropriate licensing conditions for this portfolio.
18 A patent family is a group of patents granted by different jurisdictions but concerning the same
technical invention, see Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research
Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 The Econ. J. 441, 447 (2004).
19 Cf., e.g. Huawei Technologies Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing [2019] EWCA Civ 38.
20 Beyond all general rules of jurisdiction in international private and private procedural law, one may
argue about the procedural economics of a situation in which a large number of national courts decide
on the respective domestic member of a patent family, leading to several, and potentially diverging
decisions on the same invention.
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several state courts. As to interim or conservatory measures, cross-border emer-
gency arbitrator proceedings can be much more efficient than a plethora of state
court proceedings for interim or conservatory measures in multiple jurisdictions.
Besides reducing the aforementioned risks, ADR can thereby offer to the patentee
a relatively effective IP rights enforcement, even with regard to jurisdictions where
state patent jurisdiction is suboptimal. For implementers with limited resources,
such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a single arbitration proceeding
can be much more manageable than multi-pronged state court litigation in differ-
ent jurisdictions, especially if streamlined with a view to saving time and resources.
Assessing voluminous and diverse patent portfolios is a big challenge not only
for state courts but also for arbitral tribunals. However, due to the greater flexibility
in their scope, in the design of their proceedings, and in their decision criteria,
arbitral tribunals are, to a certain extent, in a better position to handle this
challenge than a state court patent jurisdiction which is mainly designed for
scrutinizing individual patents.21 For instance, parties to an arbitral proceeding
could agree on a (tiered) ‘sampling’ in which the FRAND licensing conditions
would be determined by a full examination for a limited selection of the portfolio
SEPs, another part of the portfolio would be subject to a limited examination, and
the results would then be applied to the remaining SEPs.
2.3 HIGH ACCEPTANCE BY STATE AUTHORITIES
Many administrative22 and judicial bodies hold a decidedly positive view on
resolving SEP/FRAND conflicts through ADR: the Court of Justice of the
European Union’s (CJEU’s) seminal Huawei/ZTE decision provides for the deter-
mination of FRAND licensing conditions through an independent third party in
case the parties fail to agree on such conditions.23 Given the broad wording, which
does not expressly refer to courts, the leading view takes this passage to include
arbitration mechanisms.24
German courts favour an approach according to which a patent holder can
fulfil its FRAND licensing obligation by submitting a license offer, albeit not a
completely FRAND-compliant one, while, at the same time, subjecting itself to
21 A standard answer from the judiciary to the question of how courts can deal with a large patent
portfolio is: ‘one after the other’.
22 On recent activities of the Japanese Patent Office regarding SEP/FRAND arbitration, see Kozo Yabe,
Arbitration – Is This Good Solution for SEP Disputes?, https://aippi.org/no-show/arbitration-is-this-
good-solution-for-sep-disputes.
23 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies v. ZTE, para. 68 (16 July 2015).
24 Including Antje Baumann, Einschaltung von Schiedsgerichten zur Bestimmung der FRAND-Konditionen,
GRUR 145, 147 (2018); Chrocziel, Kasolowsky, Whitener & Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra
n. 2, Ch. 8, para. 32; Kaneko, supra n. 2, at 31, n. 53.
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third party-determination under section 315 of the German Civil Code in case of
dispute over the license conditions.25 This determination does not have to be
exercised by state courts, it can also be achieved through ADR.
In the SEP Communication it issued in November 2017,26 the EU
Commission has even gone one step further:
The Commission takes the view that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms
such as mediation and arbitration can offer swifter and less costly dispute
resolution … [T]he Commission is, together with the EUIPO [European Union
Intellectual Property Office], mapping IP mediation and arbitration tools with the
view to facilitating the further roll-out of IP mediation and arbitration services27
It squares well with this stance that the Commission has already ordered the
potential use of arbitration mechanisms in SEP/FRAND proceedings,28 as has
the US Federal Trade Commission.29 A recent report on the Commission’s SEP
Communication to the European Parliament confirms the pro-ADR approach at
the European level.30
3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK – SOFT LAW
Ad hoc arbitral tribunals, operating independently of any established arbitration
organization, are not usually in the best position to handle SEP/FRAND disputes.31
25 Regional Court of Düsseldorf (LG Düsseldorf), 31 Mar. 2016, 4a O 73/14, para. 406 et seq (openJur.
de), abuse in the case of an obviously excessive claim for fees (paras 412–13) and no sufficiently specific
licensing offer by referring to third party determination for fee determination, without quantifying it
(para. 415); Regional Court of Mannheim (LG Mannheim), 27 Nov. 2015, 2 O 106/14, para. 277
(openJur.de); see also Peter G. Picht, ‘FRAND wars 2.0’ – Rechtsprechung im Anschluss an die Huawei/
ZTE-Entscheidung des EuGH (Teil 2), WuW 300, 303 (2018).
26 EU Commission, supra n. 4, at 11.
27 See also EU Commission, Antitrust Decisions on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) – Motorola
Mobility and Samsung Electronics – Frequently Asked Questions, Memo of 29 Apr. 2014, http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-322_en.htm: ‘The Motorola decision provides a “safe har-
bour” for standard implementers who are willing to take a licence on FRAND terms. If they want to
be safe from injunctions based on SEPs by the patent holder, they can demonstrate that they are a
willing licensee by agreeing that a court or a mutually agreed arbitrator adjudicates the FRAND
terms.’
28 See e.g. Case At.39939 Samsung Electronics, Commission Decision of 29 Apr. 2014, http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39939.
29 Federal Trade Commission, The Significance of Consent Orders in the Federal Trade Commission’s
Competition Enforcement Efforts 10–11 (17 Sept. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/public_statements/significance-consent-orders-federal-trade-commission%E2%80%99s-compe
tition-enforcement-efforts-gcr-live/130917gcrspeech.pdf; Docket No. C-4410 in the Matter of
Motorola Mobility and Google, Federal Trade Commission Decision and Order, 9 et seq, www.ftc.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado.pdf.
30 Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Standard Essential Patents and the
Internet of Things 7, 12, 25 (Jan. 2019), www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/
608854/IPOL_IDA(2019)608854_EN.pdf.
31 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 23, 51.
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This is due, inter alia, to the complexity of such disputes and the challenging
selection of apt arbitrators and applies, in particular, to parties without extensive
previous experience in conducting SEP/FRAND ADR. As to suitable institutional
players, there are several options32: the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has already conducted large SEP/
FRAND proceedings33 but not yet established specific rules or guidelines for such
cases. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) offers some special
guidance for SEP/FRAND ADR.34 According to informed market participants,
WIPO’s respective model submission agreements are now regularly used, which
might lead to a substantial increase in WIPO-organized proceedings in the future.
The future role of the Patent Mediation and Arbitration Centre (PMAC), foreseen
by the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA),35 depends, in the first place,
on whether the Unitary Patent system will see the light of day at all.36 If so, the scope
of jurisdiction of the PMAC will be a core issue. According to a restrictive view, the
PMAC can (summarily speaking) decide only on core patent law matters (e.g.
infringement) regarding unitary patents or European Patents (cf. Article 3 UPCA),
but not, for instance, on contractual claims resulting from a licensing relationship (cf.
Article 32(1)(h) UPCA though) or on SEPs covering the identical technology as a
32 To name but a few: International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Deutsche Institution für
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (DIS), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and
American Arbitration Association International Center for Dispute Resolution (AAA-ICDR).
33 See e.g. the proceedings between InterDigital and Huawei (InterDigital Quarterly Report Pursuant to
s. 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Quarterly Period Ended 10–11 (30 Sept.
2016), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1405495/000140549516000076/idcc-q39302016.htm);
between Nokia and LG Electronics (www.nokia.com/en_int/news/releases/2017/09/18/nokia-
receives-decision-in-patent-license-arbitration-with-lg-electronics); between Nokia and BlackBerry
(www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-nokia-patents/blackberry-loses-payment-dispute-with-
nokia-to-pay-137-million-idUSKBN1DV517).
34 See in particular WIPO, Guidance on WIPO FRAND Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (2017),
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/wipofrandadrguidance.pdf (which is based on the
Munich IPDR Forum FRAND Guidelines); see further the Model Submission Agreements for
different WIPO ADR options, www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/ict/frand.
35 Cf. in particular Art. 35 UPCA.
36 In Germany, the ratification of the UPCA has been delayed due to a constitutional complaint by
lawyer Stjerna (www.stjerna.de/vb). Being one of the three mandatory signatories (the other two
being France and the United Kingdom), Germany’s ratification is needed for entry into force. A
decision by the Federal Constitutional Court is expected for 2019 (www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
EN/Verfahren/Jahresvorausschau/vs_2019/vorausschau_2019_node.html, Case no. 2 BvR 739/17).
However, even if Germany ratifies, the entry into force is unclear due to Brexit. The United Kingdom
ratified the UPCA in Apr. 2018 (www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-ratifies-the-unified-patent-
court-agreement) and wants to stay in the UPC system after Brexit (HM Government, The Future
Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union, July 2018, Ch. 1, para. 151, https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786626/
The_Future_Relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union_120319.pdf).
For more information see http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2019/01/18/the-unified-patent-court-
all-dressed-up-but-no-place-to-go.
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unitary patent or European Patent but granted by another jurisdiction.37 If this view
were to prevail, PMAC’s ability to attract larger SEP/FRAND disputes appears
questionable.
Not only framework rules of institutions, such as the ICC or WIPO, but also
other components of soft law38 play an important role in ADR. Even where parties
do not choose to make them binding, they can influence the arbitral tribunal as best
practice.39 This is true for ADR in the SEP/FRAND area as well. In fact, the area
experiences considerable model rule creation activity by non-state40 actors. An
International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI) working
group is dealing with the topic41 and the Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum
(Munich IPDR), a non-profit association for the promotion of IP procedures
through dialogue and research,42 has just issued its ‘FRAND ADR Case
Management Guidelines.’43 Based on in-depth consultations with relevant market
players, these guidelines highlight the most important aspects of SEP/FRAND ADR
and aim at providing guidance to parties and arbitrators on how to handle complex
SEP/FRAND proceedings (see references in this article for details).44
4 SCOPE OF ARBITRATION
Among the typical subject matters of IP arbitration, all kinds of license disputes
figure prominently, such as disputes on claims to the granting of a license, on the
conditions and execution of the license agreement, or on post-contractual
obligations.45 Core IP matters, such as (initial) ownership or validity, keep tribu-
nals busy as well.46 In principle, the same issues also constitute the main field of
37 In depth and with a moderately expanding tendency of the PMAC’s scope, see Picht, supra n. 2, at
9–11; see also Kaneko, supra n. 2, at 89, 97, n. 441.
38 Cf. e.g. IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2019) and IBA Guidelines
for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses (2010), www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_
IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx; CIArb Guideline 5 Security for Costs, 2016, www.ciarb.org/
resources/guidelines-ethics/international-arbitration.
39 See for more information FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, Annex II.
40 State-generated soft law on SEP/FRAND is contained, to some extent, in official opinions such as the
SEP Communication of the EU Commission (supra n. 4) or the Guide to Licensing Negotiations
Involving Standard Essential Patents of the Japan Patent Office (www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/
guideline/patent/document/seps-tebiki/guide-seps-en.pdf).
41 AIPPI Standing Committee on Standards and Patents, http://aippi.org/committee/standards-and-patents.
42 See www.ipdr-forum.org; the author Peter Georg Picht is a board member of the Munich IP Dispute
Resolution Forum, but the article only expresses his own position, not necessarily that of the Forum.
43 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13.
44 Ibid., para. 11.
45 Cf. e.g. Higher Regional Court of Cologne (OLG Köln), 19 Sch. 8/11 (6 July 2012); BlackBerry v.
Qualcomm (www.marketwatch.com/story/blackberry-awarded-final-940-million-in-arbitration-with-
qualcomm-over-royalties-2017-05-26).
46 Cf. e.g. ICC Case No. 6097, Interim Award of 1989, 4 ICC Bull. 76 (1993); cf. also Federal Patent
Court (BPatG), 12 June 2012, 33 W (pat) 58/10.
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activity for arbitral tribunals in SEP/FRAND proceedings. There are, however,
technical, legal, and economic particularities.
Typically, the details of FRAND licensing conditions for the respective SEP
portfolio is of central importance.47 This can include not only the amount and
calculation method of the license fee, but also the license term, material, and
territorial use restrictions, or cross-licensing issues. However, the task of the
arbitral tribunal can exceed the mere determination of a ‘price tag’ for a given
SEP portfolio.48
One additional, characteristic question is: which of the declared SEPs in the
portfolio actually are standard-essential and being used by the implementer, so that
a license is necessary? Of course, SEP owners will usually not license their
portfolios on a patent-specific basis, by enumerating all covered patents, but rather
by way of a comprehensive license to all patents that are or might become essential.
This is because only such a broad license guarantees legal certainty for the standard-
based market activity of the implementer. For the purpose of determining license
conditions, however, and especially for the calculation of royalties, the number of
patents to be licensed from the portfolio remains of relevance. This is all the more
so because many SSOs do not check whether the declared SEPs really are valid and
essential in the sense that a use of the standard necessarily requires use of the
patent.49 The intuitive assumption is that the absence of neutral checks tends to
create divergence between declared and actual SEPs, as well as disputes on the
extent of this divergence.50 It would be misleading, however, trying to attribute
this to strategic over-declaration on the part of the patentee alone. Other factors,
such as diverging interpretations of the patent claims or extremely broad declara-
tion obligations under the SSO rules,51 can also play a role. Furthermore, a
47 Cf. supra n. 33.
48 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, para. 41.
49 This includes ETSI, the SSO developing the important mobile communications standards of the ‘G’
family.
50 Cf. on patent invalidity in general Joachim Henkel & Hans Zischka, Why Most Patents Are
Invalid – Extent, Reasons, and Potential Remedies of Patent Invalidity, www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Henkel_Joachim_IPSC_paper_2014_20140813.pdf; Thomas Kühnen & Rolf Claessen, Die
Durchsetzung von Patenten in der EU – Standortbestimmung vor Einführung des europäischen Patentgerichts,
GRUR 592, 594 (2013); Peter Hess, Tilman Müller-Stoy & Martin Wintermeier, Sind Patente nur
‘Papiertiger’?, MittdtPatA 439 (2014).
51 Cf. e.g. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.
pdf), para. 4.1: ‘each MEMBER shall use its reasonable endeavours, in particular during the develop-
ment of a STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION where it participates, to inform ETSI
of ESSENTIAL IPRs in a timely fashion. In particular, a MEMBER submitting a technical proposal
for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION shall, on a bona fide basis, draw the
attention of ETSI to any of that MEMBER’s IPR which might be ESSENTIAL if that proposal is
adopted.’
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complex ICT standard typically contains elements of differing function and sig-
nificance. While the core of the standard needs to be used by all implementers,
other components are of relevance for specific user groups only and some compo-
nents could not successfully establish themselves in the market and are not widely
used at all (‘dead language’). It may, therefore, very well be the case that an
implementer uses the patents on the core of the standard and patents on compo-
nents that are relevant for its business model, but not the patents on other
components of the standard.52 For this reason alone, not all patents declared as
essential must be essential to – in the sense of necessarily used by – this particular
implementer.
Another issue beyond the determination of a portfolio ‘price tag’ is the parties’
negotiation and, more generally, pre-ADR conduct. In its Huawei/ZTE decision,
the CJEU has chosen a rather procedural approach, avoiding almost all statements
about the FRAND content of a licensing package and focusing, instead, on
conduct obligations in the process of FRAND licensing negotiations.53 The
numerous cases in which parties are seeking the determination of FRAND licen-
sing conditions before state courts54 raise some doubts on whether the CJEU’s
reliance on a fair negotiation process will be able to eradicate FRAND licensing
disputes in the future. In any case, it has made FRAND party conduct a point on
which the grant of an injunction or, conversely, the claim to a FRAND license can
turn and, hence, an aspect of key importance to state court and ADR proceedings
alike.
5 ARBITRABILITY
As to SEP/FRAND licensing conditions, any doubts regarding their arbitrability55
are, for practical purposes at least, dispelled by the clear, affirmative position of the
courts56 and the EU Commission.57
The arbitrability of ‘core IP matters’ (mainly validity and first ownership) is
more problematic and depends on the respective jurisdiction.58 Many jurisdictions
deny arbitrability of such core matters to the extent a resulting award would have
52 In detail Peter G. Picht, ‘FRAND wars 2.0’ – Rechtsprechung im Anschluss an die Huawei/ZTE-
Entscheidung des EuGH (Teil 1), WuW 234, 238 (2018), with further references.
53 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies v. ZTE, paras 61–71 (16 July 2015).
54 For an overview see Picht, supra n. 52; Picht, supra n. 25.
55 See in detail Peter G. Picht, Schiedsverfahren in SEP/FRAND-Streitigkeiten – Überblick und Kernprobleme,
GRUR 11, 17–18 (2019).
56 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies v. ZTE, para. 68 (16 July 2015); Baumann, supra n. 24, at 147.
57 EU Commission, supra n. 4, at 11.
58 See the overview in Chrocziel, Kasolowsky, Whitener & Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra n. 2,
Ch. 3, table 1, paras 7–15; Trevor Cook & Alejandro I. Garcia, International Intellectual Property
Arbitration 50–52 (2nd ed., 2010); Dário Moura Vicente, Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes:
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erga omnes effect, i.e. also affecting persons who were not parties to the
proceedings.59 However, even these jurisdictions frequently permit inter partes
awards on core IP matters, binding only the parties to the proceedings, or even
awards with ‘indirect’ erga omnes effect, obliging a party to undertake steps (e.g.
waiving an IP right) which, themselves, generate an erga omnes effect.60
In any case, erga omnes effects are not necessarily the first choice of parties to an
arbitral proceeding, and this tendency might be particularly marked for SEP/
FRAND arbitration proceedings: If a tribunal holds a patent to be invalid or not
infringed with bilateral effect only, the patent owner is, in principle, no longer
entitled to royalties from the other party to the proceeding. The outcome does
not, however, automatically have an effect vis-à-vis competitors of the implemen-
ter and potential other licensees of the patent owner. Consequently, vis-à-vis such
other market participants, the patent continues to offer a chance for its owner to
collect royalties, and for the implementer it provides at least a certain shielding
effect against competition from non-licensing market participants.
6 CHOICE OF LAW
Whatever the bilateral or multi-sided effects of an arbitral award, the latter needs to
be based on certain rules. This raises the question of the parties’ possibility to
choose these rules. A distinction must be drawn here between the law applicable to
the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, the law governing the substance of the
case, and the law applicable to the arbitration clause in its capacity as a contractual
agreement.61 Taking German law as an example, the law on procedure consists,
firstly, of mandatory rules of national arbitration law at the place of arbitration (lex
loci arbitri); secondly, of rules agreed upon by the parties (German Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1042(3)), such as the arbitration rules of an institution desig-
nated by them; thirdly, of non-mandatory rules of the lex loci arbitri.62 If these rules
A Comparative Survey, 31 Arb. Int’l 151 (2015), from a Belgian, Canadian (Québec), French,
Portuguese, South African, and US perspective.
59 General non-arbitrability of patent invalidity in South Africa (Vicente, supra n. 58, at 153; Chrocziel,
Kasolowsky, Whitener & Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra n. 2, Ch. 3, table 1, at 23) and China
(Ibid. Ch. 3, table 1, at 20 and n. 80); arbitrability only inter partes in England (Ibid., Ch. 3, table 1, at
20–21 and n. 84) and presumably in France (Vicente, supra n. 58, at 154–55; Edouard Fortunet,
Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes in France, 26 Arb. Int’l 281, 290–93 (2010)).
60 Cf. Chrocziel, Kasolowsky, Whitener & Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra n. 2, Ch. 3, paras 7–
14.
61 Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts & Philipp Höttler, Anwendbares Recht bei Schiedsverfahren mit Sitz in Deutschland,
SchiedsVZ 267, 268 (2011).
62 Schmidt-Ahrendts & Höttler, supra n. 61, at 268; in Germany, the pertinent provision is Code of Civil
Procedure, s. 1042(1) and (2).
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do not provide an answer, the arbitral tribunal decides at its discretion (Code of
Civil Procedure, section 1042(4)(1)).63
German law expressly provides for an option to choose the law applicable to the
substance of the dispute in section 1051(1)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.64 For
disputes involving SEP/FRAND portfolios, such a choice of law is very attractive
since it allows the placing of many facets of the dispute under the same legal regime,
reducing not only the resources required for covering multiple national laws but also
the risk of contradictions between these laws. Disputes springing from an existing
license agreement can oftentimes be resolved, to a large extent, under the law
applicable to the license contract, as determined by choice of law or objective
rules on conflicts of laws. However, in what is probably the most important
constellation of SEP/FRAND disputes at present, parties fight over whether and
under which conditions the implementer needs to take and the patentee needs to
grant a license based on the FRAND declaration. According to the leading view (at
least) on European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) FRAND
declarations, these statements do not, in themselves, constitute a licensing agreement
between the patent owner and the individual implementer but merely oblige the
patentee to enter, under certain conditions, into such agreements.65 Hence, and
unless one wants to deduce from the respective SSO policy a choice of law with
effect for future FRAND declaration-based licensing agreements, this prototypical
constellation of SEP/FRAND disputes lacks a law applicable to a pre-existing
contract, which could provide a legal framework for the dispute as well. This
makes a choice of law under ADR rules all the more attractive.
Parties’ choice of law options have their limitations, though, especially in the
principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights. It states that core IP matters
are mandatorily subject to the law of the jurisdiction which has granted the
respective IP right (the so-called lex loci protectionis).66 Regardless of whether, and
to which extent, Articles 8 and 13 of the Rome II Regulation67 have, nowadays,
made the application of the lex loci protectionis a mandatory part of statutory EU law,
it follows from the principle of territoriality that parties cannot derogate application
of this law to core IP matters, arguably not even within ADR68
63 Schmidt-Ahrendts & Höttler, supra n. 61, at 268.
64 Ibid., at 268–69.
65 McGuire, supra n. 7, at 128–29 with further references, 131, 133, mentioning that the legal system to
which the FRAND declaration is subject to does not prevent the parties from a choice of law for the
license agreement based on it.
66 For the lex loci protectionis principle, see Joseph Drexl, Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch,
Band 12, part 8, para. 10 (7th ed. 2018).
67 Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’).
68 Cf. on this, and on the controversy regarding the scope of Rome II Regulation, Arts 8 and 13, Mary-
Rose McGuire, beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR, Art. 8 Rom II-VO, para. 54 (ed. of 1 Dec.
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7 ARBITRATION CLAUSE
7.1 EXISTENCE
Without a pre-existing arbitration agreement, opponents will usually find it much
more difficult to consent to an ADR mechanism for their conflict. In the SEP/
FRAND context, pre-existing arbitration agreements are often lacking as the
dispute is not about an existing licensing relationship, but rather about its establish-
ment. On the other hand, SEP/FRAND disputes frequently involve experienced
market players who see the advantages of ADR and succeed in reaching an
arbitration agreement even after the legal conflict has already arisen. While specific
state law is (as yet) not available,69 the SSOs’ IPR policies and the FRAND
declarations of SEP holders could potentially establish ex ante arbitration clauses
binding patentees and implementers. However, neither the IPR policy of ETSI
nor the policies of other SSOs contain language to this effect. In particular, typical
SSO rules do not oblige SEP owners to integrate an arbitration clause into their
FRAND declarations.70 Courts and agencies are likely to boost readiness to enter
into ad hoc arbitration agreements when they consider such readiness an indicator
for a party’s compliance with the procedural prong of FRAND.71 Some first steps
2016); Andreas Spickhoff, BeckOK BGB, Art. 8 Rom II-VO, para. 3 (48th ed., of 1 Nov. 2017);
Hannes Unberath, Johannes Cziupka & Steffen Pabst, EuZPR-EuIPR, Kommentar Europäsches
Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht, Art. 8 Rom II-VO, para. 8 (4th ed., 2016); Peter G. Picht, Vom
materiellen Wert des Immateriellen – Immaterialgüterrechte als Kreditsicherungsmittel im nationalen und inter-
nationalen Rechtsverkehr 546–48, 558–59 (2018). On the (lack of a) binding effect of the EU Regulation
for arbitral tribunals, see in detail Alexander Grimm, Applicability of the Rome I and II Regulations to
International Arbitration, SchiedsVZ 189 (2012); Schmidt-Ahrendts & Höttler, supra n. 61, at 269–70,
the prevailing opinion in arbitration literature rejects the binding effect of the Rome Regulations for
arbitral tribunals. On intermediary views that want to give s. 1051 of the Code of Civil Procedure
precedence, while still respecting limitations on choice of law (Rechtswahlverbot), Mary-Rose McGuire,
Grenzen der Rechtswahlfreiheit im Schiedsverfahrensrecht? Über das Verhältnis zwischen der Rom-I-VO und §
1051 ZPO, SchiedsVZ 257, 260–61 (2011).
69 On possible FRAND regulation see Reto M. Hilty & Peter R. Slowinski, Standardessentielle
Patente – Perspektiven außerhalb des Kartellrechts, GRUR Int. 781 (2015).
70 Some SSOs have ADR clauses, however, e.g. Art. 14.7 of the Memorandum of Understanding of the
Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) project (version 3 Jan. 2014) which provides for arbitration on the
basis of ICC Rules, whereby the arbitral tribunal consists of three members, takes place in Frankfurt,
and German law applies (www.dvb.org/members/rulesandprocedures); Art. 16(5) of the Blu-Ray
Disc Association Bylaws (version 2.0 rev., updated as of 1 Oct. 2010) provides for arbitration under
the AAA Rules in New York consisting of one arbitrator (http://blu-raydisc.com/Assets/
Downloadablefile/BDA_Bylaws_%28v2.0%29-18618.pdf); the licensing declaration of the Open
Mobile Alliance IPR Procedural Guidelines for OMA Members (4 Feb. 2004) also provides for
arbitration (http://openmobilealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Member_IPRGuidelines_
v53006.pdf), but refers (somewhat confusingly) to the application form, according to which ‘exclusive
jurisdiction of the English courts to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection with
the Application Form’ (Application Form, Art. 7.1, version of 12 Mar. 2018, www.omaspecworks.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/OMA-Reference-2018-0001R01-General_Application.pdf).
71 Cf. on ad hoc arbitration agreements in the FRAND context, Baumann, supra n. 24, at 149; FRAND
Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 16–18.
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in this direction seem promising,72 but authorities should not push this approach
too far. The arbitral mechanism has advantages as well as disadvantages and it is not
equally suited for every SEP/FRAND dispute. Experienced state courts can be
very skilful and effective in resolving SEP/FRAND disputes, and parties must
remain free to favour them over ADR where they feel this serves their needs and
interests best.73
7.2 SCOPE
A suitable arbitration clause is of great importance for the success of arbitral
proceedings. It determines key aspects, such as the place of arbitration, the
application of soft law rules,74 and the scope and subject matter of the proceedings.
As to the scope of SEP/FRAND arbitration, parties must decide, in particular,
whether the arbitral tribunal shall merely determine the ‘price tag’ for a given
portfolio or whether it shall also engage in portfolio selection, scrutinizing the
patents for which a license is necessary.75 Further specifications on scope are
possible,76 for instance, regarding the methodology for determining license
conditions77; whether only the license fee or the entire package of license condi-
tions shall be determined; whether objections regarding validity, standard-essenti-
ality, exhaustion or infringement of portfolio patents are not admitted, considered
only implicitly, or fully examined and addressed by a specific decision; whether the
results of assessing a sample of selected portfolio patents should be relevant for
determining the licensing conditions for the whole SEP portfolio; if so, how the
relevant patents are selected for the sampling exercise; forms of relief the tribunal
may grant (royalty payment obligations, damages, (preliminary) injunctive relief,
etc.); and whether the arbitral tribunal retains decision-making power after the
termination of the arbitral proceedings, e.g. in order to be able to punish the
breach of obligations arising from the arbitral award. Existing model clauses78 are a
72 EU Commission, supra n. 27: ‘If they want to be safe from injunctions based on SEPs by the patent
holder, they can demonstrate that they are a willing licensee by agreeing that a court or a mutually
agreed arbitrator adjudicates the FRAND terms.’
73 Forcing parties to generally consent to ADR may also affect their fundamental right of access to justice,
cf. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47; Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 6.
74 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 73–74, as well as Annex II.
75 Ibid., paras 39–40.
76 Cf. in detail FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 36–48.
77 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 44–45, as well as Annex I.
78 See e.g. the FRAND specific WIPO Model Submission Agreements (www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/
specific-sectors/ict/frand) as well as the general WIPO Contract Clauses and Submission Agreements
(www.wipo.int/amc/en/clauses/index.html); AAA Arbitration Clauses (www.adr.org/Clauses); ICC
Arbitration Clauses (https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/arbitration-clause);
SCAI Arbitration Clauses (www.swissarbitration.org/Arbitration/Arbitration-clauses).
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good starting point for drafting the arbitration clause in a particular setting, but
they will usually require individual adjustment.
8 CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS – CONFIDENTIALITY
Many factors which contribute to the successful conduct of ADR proceedings
cannot be examined in detail here, including the taking of evidence,79 a potential
right to appeal the arbitral award,80 or the appropriate balance between speed,
efficiency, and due process requirements.81 Confidentiality matters, however, are
of such a prominence in the present discourse on SEP/FRAND ADR that they
necessitate a closer look.
On the one hand, the confidentiality of ADR proceedings is, arguably, one
of the most important reasons why parties prefer to settle their dispute by such
means rather than in state courts.82 This interest in confidentiality seems quite
legitimate,83 especially given the need to protect the business secrets which may
surface during the proceedings. On the other hand, there is a public interest in
having access to the key results of SEP/FRAND ADR proceedings. Without
such access, state courts, agencies, academia, and other stakeholders will have
difficulty in obtaining a comprehensive view on legal developments in the field.
Nor can they carry out a critical review of potential aberrations in decisions taken
by arbitral tribunals. Parties that do not regularly arbitrate (SMEs, for instance)
might be at a loss evaluating their chances and strategy in potential ADR
proceedings. In an area already characterized (due to collective standard-setting)
by increased cooperation between competitors84 and prone to the abuse of SEP
ownership-based dominance,85 ‘secrecy’ in a conflict resolution mechanism
which is based on a consensual (arbitration) agreement may give rise to competi-
tion law concerns and corresponding law enforcement.86
79 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 57–66.
80 Ibid., paras 84–88.
81 Cf. on this, FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 56, 68.
82 In detail Chrocziel, Kasolowsky, Whitener & Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra n. 2, Ch. 6;
FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, paras 78–79, confidentiality is by no means a mandatory character-
istic of arbitration proceedings, but must in principle be agreed by the parties.
83 Regarding this interest see also Joachim Münch, Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung, Band 3,
Buch 10, Vorbemerkung zu § 1025, para. 95 (5th ed., 2017).
84 See e.g. Thomas Weck, Schutzrechte und Standards aus Sicht des Kartellrechts, NJOZ 1177, 1186 (2009);
Christian Koenig & Kristin Spiekermann, EC Competition Law Issues of Standard Setting by Officially-
Entrusted Versus Private Organisations, 31 ECLR 449, 453–57 (2010); EU Commission, Guidelines on
the Applicability of Art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal
Co-operation Agreements, paras 294–95; Picht, supra n. 8, at 2, with further references.
85 Picht, supra n. 7, at 438 et seq.
86 Cf. also, with slightly different focus, FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, para. 81.
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Against this background, it is encouraging that the consultations leading up to
the Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum (IPDR) FRAND ADR Guidelines
revealed a broad readiness of relevant market players to accept certain restrictions
on confidentiality.87 In line with this, the ICC released in 2019 an updated ‘Note
to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC
Rules of Arbitration’ which includes an opt-out approach to the publication of
awards.88 For SEP/FRAND ADR, proactive confidentiality restrictions by the
stakeholders may prove to be a wiser approach than waiting for potential inter-
ventions by state authorities. It seems highly questionable, for instance, whether
the EU Commission would simply accept being kept in the dark, due to con-
fidentiality arrangements, on the basic competition law compliance of large-scale
SEP/FRAND ADR proceedings and awards.
Considering partial disclosure of contents of SEP/FRAND arbitral proceedings
does not necessarily question confidentiality in its entirety. The key is to strike a
balance between legitimate party interests in confidentiality and legitimate public
interests in getting hold of the ‘big picture.’89 Which and how contents of SEP/
FRANDADR should bemade available is a complex and novel question that requires
further expert discussion and, possibly, an experimental phase. The FRAND ADR
Guidelines authored by the Munich IPDR Forum provide a starting point for this
discourse by suggesting, subject to party approval, the disclosure of the FRAND
determination methodology applied in the respective case to a neutral instance.90
This information is of great relevance, as the ‘price tag’ for the licensing of a
portfolio forms the typical centre of today’s SEP/FRAND disputes and as various
contract and competition law issues play out there. At the same time, it seems
possible – and necessary – to separate the abstract FRAND methodology from the
economic and technical circumstances of the individual case and, thereby, to
respect confidentiality where necessary.91 At least as long as sufficient experience
regarding such a limited disclosure mechanism is lacking, however, the parties
should have the final say on whether confidentiality restrictions apply.
87 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, at 12.
88 Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC Rules of
Arbitration, 1 Jan. 2019, paras 40–46, https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/icc-
note-to-parties-and-arbitral-tribunals-on-the-conduct-of-arbitration.pdf.
89 FRAND Guidelines, supra n. 13, at 12, and especially paras 78–83.
90 Ibid., para. 81 and Annex III.
91 Ibid., para. 81 and the optional clauses in Annex III.
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9 LINKING ADR RESULTS TO (SUBSEQUENT) STATE
PROCEEDINGS
9.1 ADR licenses as comparables
The analysis of ‘comparable’ licenses (‘Comparables’) is one of the leading methods
for determining SEP/FRAND license conditions.92 Obviously, the compilation of
Comparables forms a central step of this method and poses the question of whether
licenses from arbitral proceedings can serve as Comparables. Two recent, promi-
nent court decisions have given different answers: in TCL v. Ericsson, Judge Selna
admitted the license determined in an arbitration between Ericsson and Huawei as
Comparable without much ado.93 The Unwired Planet v. Huawei decision by Justice
Birss did not exclude the consideration of Comparables stemming from arbitral
proceedings either, but made it dependent on whether the state court gets to see
not only the eventual license terms but also the reasoning leading to their
determination.94 Although this position may, in part, have been influenced by
the fact that the court was informed rather late – and somewhat unfortu-
nately – about the ADR background of the respective Comparable,95 it is true
that a court can usually assess the comparative value of a license only if it is aware
of some background information. In any case, the U.K. decision in Unwired Planet
v. Huawei is another argument for moderate transparency in SEP/FRAND ADR.
9.2 ENFORCEABILITY – EU competition law as a public policy hurdle
The cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards requires recognition and enforce-
ability according to the New York Convention. In this article, we highlight only
one of the possible enforcement obstacles under the Convention, namely a viola-
tion of public policy (Article V(2)(b)) due to non-compliance with competition
law.96 At least in the realm of EU law, SEP/FRAND disputes involve a strong
competition law component and some enforcers, including the Court of Justice of
the European Union’s (CJEU) and Advocate General Wathelet, consider Articles
101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to
form part of public policy, possibly together with the secondary law based on these
92 Peter G. Picht, FRAND determination in TCL v. Ericsson and Unwired Planet v. Huawei: Same Same but
Different?, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 18–07, 35–36.
93 TCL Commun. Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVS-DFM
(C.D. Cal. 2017), Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 82.
94 Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat), paras 171, 411–13.
95 Cf. ibid., para. 341.
96 See e.g. on the grounds for setting aside under the New York Convention, which coincide mostly
with Code of Civil Procedure, s. 1059(2), Musielak/Voit, Zivilprozessordnung, § 1061 ZPO paras 13–
27 (16th ed., 2019).
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provisions.97 Considering its detailed, fluctuating, and at times contradictory or
otherwise unconvincing nature, it is not advisable to regard the full body of EU
competition law as EU public policy, after all a classification reserved for funda-
mental, unwaivable components of a legal system.98 Nonetheless, given the present
views mentioned above, ADR parties and decision-makers must not neglect the
susceptibility of SEP/FRAND proceedings to ordre public concerns based on
competition law. Especially for arbitrators, this can be more easily said than
done, all the more so as important aspects at the crossroads between ADR and
EU (competition) law remain unclear: does the arbitral tribunal need to apply EU
competition law ex officio or can it restrict itself to what the parties submitted? The
courts of the Member States are divided on the extent to which they can review
the arbitral award and the required intensity of the competition law violation.99
Advocate General Wathelet seems to prefer, in his Genentech opinion, a complete
assessment of EU competition law independent of the parties’ submissions100; the
CJEU has left the question unanswered.101 To give another example, the CJEU
has taken a clearer, negative stance on the ability of arbitral tribunals to refer
questions for preliminary ruling.102 How, then, shall a SEP/FRAND arbitral
tribunal deal with identified, but unresolved competition law issues? As a tentative
answer, requirements must not be overstretched here. If, for example, the arbitral
tribunal follows – absent final determination by the CJEU or the General Court of
the European Union – the interpretation of EU competition law given by one
Member State court, a contradicting interpretation103 by another Member State
97 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l N. V., paras 36–39 (1 June 1999); Opinion
of Advocate General Wathelet, C-567/14, paras 55–72 (17 Mar. 2016).
98 Michael Stürner, beck-online.GROSSKOMMENTAR, Art. 26 Rom II-VO paras 2, 14 (ed. of 1 Mar.
2019).
99 In detail Chrocziel, Kasolowsky, Whitener & Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra n. 2, Ch. 11,
paras 39–43.
100 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 17 Mar. 2016, Case C-567/14, paras 55–58.
101 Parallel questions may arise e.g. in pay-for-delay settlements, see Claudia Seitz, Pay-for-delay-Verträge in
der pharmazeutischen Industrie, Rechtslage und offene Fragen nach dem Lundbeck-Urteil, EuZW 856 (2016);
Alexander Eufinger, ‘pay-for-delay-agreements’ als wettbewerbswidrige Patentverlängerungen im Pharmabereich,
PharmR 385 (2015); Peter G. Picht, Reverse payment settlements – US Rechtslage und die Antwort des
europäischen Kartellrechts, ZWeR 83 (2014); Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl
Shapiro, The Actaivs Inference: Theory and Practice, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14–459,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2560107.
102 Cf. Kaneko, supra n. 2, at 293–96, referring to the Nordsee decision of the CJEU (Case 102/81), which
has since been confirmed; Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Case C-567/14, para. 59 (17 Mar.
2016), referring to Eco Swiss (Case C-126/97) and Gazprom (Case C-536/13).
103 One example from the SEP/FRAND area would be the competition law violation of any non-
FRAND license offer (German courts’ tendency) versus the competition law violation of only offers
that deviate significantly from the FRAND level (Justice Birss’ tendency in Unwired Planet), cf. Peter
G. Picht, Unwired Planet v. Huawei: A Seminal SEP/FRAND Decision from the UK, GRUR Int. 569
(2017).
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court cannot, as a general rule, render the arbitral award a violation of competition
law-based public policy.
10 CONCLUSION
The growing importance of SEP/FRAND arbitration and its increasing acceptance
by public and private stakeholders are good news. State jurisdiction must and will
continue to play an important role, but alternative dispute resolution provides a
valuable tool in this field of law and business. Several steps can further improve
ADR’s aptitude to handle SEP/FRAND disputes, including reasonable compli-
ance with competition law, widely accepted confidentiality standards, or the
shaping of standardized proceedings affordable for SMEs. Specific arbitral rules or
principles may be an important contribution towards such a legal development,
and maybe the Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum (IPDR) Guidelines can be
an impetus towards the elaboration and use of such rules.
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